INTRODUCTION
The present paper was prepared as a contribution to two sessions of the statistical meetings held in New Y sessions, with several speakers, were concerned with the s reference to Bayes. The papers offered for discussion are Jerome Cornfield [2] and by Herbert Robbins and Ester S are not isolated studies but members of three different s with a different philosophical outlook. During the year 19 buted at least four different papers on the subject.
The purpose of the present paper is to examine and to c schools of thought with reference to a certain historical p perspective it would appear that we are now witnessing a in statistical theory that, for some reason, failed to at circles of statisticians.
CYCLES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES
In the development of particular scientific disciplines i a number of different "fronts" and consider them separat a number of such fronts may be distinguished, for ex analysis, the front of experimental design, etc. In a s given front it is interesting to distinguish certain recurr it, each cycle is roughly divided into three distinct phas Phase (i) is the phase of vague feelings experienced by a that the contemporary stage of the domain under stu and that, in order to achieve real progress, a new start f sary. If the incipient cycle is of considerable importance start is not easy, and the workers concerned may b occasionally in circles, solving here and there a mino satisfied and apt to be dogmatic and to engage in fruitle In pure mathematics, on the front of integration, a ph the early part of this century. One of its marks was the logical" functions which declined to have an integral continuous had no derivatives. The easy way out, ado of that period, was to postulate away the difficulty b items and by declining to call them functions. Similar d front of probability and, particularly, on the philosophi tween probability theory and the physical world.
Phase (ii) of the developmental cycle begins when someone manages to find a formulation of the problem and produces at least a partial solution. This is a breakthrough. The dogmas frequently advanced in phase (i) become pointless, and a new fruitful field of research is opened. One might expect the event to be greeted by general applause and by an immediate reorientation of research. In due course this ordinarily does happen, but not at once, and the new idea takes quite some time to break the established routine of thought and to penetrate the minds of the rank and file of scholars. On the integration front in pure mathematics the breakthrough was accomplished by Lebesgue. The majority of my own university teachers contempleted the new concept with suspicion and enmity. However, Lebesgue's ideas took hold and, after a decade or two, not only integration, but the whole body of mathematics began to look different than it did before Lebesgue. Similarly, in probability and on the front of its relation to reality, there was a tremendous change after Kolmogorov's axiomatization on the one hand and after von Mises' philosophical writings on the other.
The beginning of phase (iii) of the developmental cycle is difficult to pinpoint. The phase itself is marked with more or less general recognition of the basic idea produced by the earlier breakthrough and with a rush to solve the outstanding problems. Various generalizations and particularizations of the basic concepts are offered and various applications to other domains developed. The third phase of the cycle climaxed by the concept of Lebesgue integral lasted for a long time. In probability, the third phase of the Kolmogorov cycle is in full bloom right now, with Kolmogorov's own active participation.
BAYES' FRONT IN THEORY OF STATISTICS
In this section I shall sketch the essence of the "Bayes' front" in mathemat statistics. This will be done in two forms, first mathematically and next using sev examples taken from applied fields.
Consider a set 0 of items to be described as parameter points. To each param point 0 E 0 there corresponds a distribution P0 over some space E described a experimental space. It is given that an observable random variable X with values in follows one of the distributions P0 with unknown value of the parameter 0. In con nection with some contemplated action it is important to know that value & o parameter 0 that corresponds to the observable X. The appropriate experimen performed yielding X = x. What can one say about &? Denote by A the set possible action. What should be the rule a(x) determining the action to be t when the observed value of X is X? Still in other words, how best to define a fun a(x) on E, with values in A so as to optimize, in some sense, the selection of the ac to be taken in accordance with the results of observations?
It will be noticed that none of the questions asked constitutes a mathematical problem. The PROBLEM of the Bayes' front consists precisely in reformulating these questions so as to obtain mathematical problems that can be solved using the basic datum: 0, E, P0 and A, with an appropriate formalization of what is intended to achieve.
Here are a few examples of applied problems which will be repeatedly referred to in further discussion. In order to avoid the suggestion of any judgment of the relative importance of the domains of application, the examples are presented in alphabetical order. Example 1. Acceptance sampling. A big consumer organization purchases certain items delivered in lots. N is the number of item in a lot, n is the number of those items randomly selected for inspection, X is the number of defectives in the sample and 0 the number of defectives in the lot. The parameter space E consists of N + 1 integers 0, 1, 2, ... , N. The set A of actions contemplated may include only two elements "accept lot" and "reject lot", or may be more comprehensive. The general set up is familiar to the readers. Example 2. Astronomy. A given galaxy G may be a member of a physical system of multiplicity 0. In other words, G may be a single galaxy and 0 = 1. Or G may be a member of a physical pair in which case 0 = 2. Alternatively, G may be a member of a triplet, quadruplet, etc., with corresponding values of 0 = 3,4, . . . In this case the parameter space E is the set of positive integers. The experimental space E may be taken as comprising all possible combinations X of various measurements regarding G and its neighbour galaxies on the photographic plate. If a galaxy G is a member of a system of multiplicity 0 = 2, then G and its companion can be used, jointly with other similar pairs, for the estimation of the average mass of galaxies. Denote by M2 the method of doing so applicable to physical pairs. If 0 = 3 so that the galaxy G is a member of a physical triplet, then method M2 is not applicable and, instead, one may use method M3, etc. We assume that, with the available observations, single galaxies cannot be used for estimating the average mass. The set A of contemplated actions regarding G is: (1) drop G as a single galaxy; (2) use G and its companion for study by method M2, etc. The statistical problem is how best to use the available observations to compile lists of double, triple, etc. galaxies.
Example 3. Diagnostic tests. The value of a parameter 0 is an important characteristic of health (e.g. average blood pressure, blood sugar content, etc.) Accordingly, prior te being examined by a physician, each patient is routinely subjected to a series of diagnostic tests meant to provide data for the estimation of 0. I need not emphasize that what is observed at these tests is not the value of 0 but only the value of a random variable X whose distribution depends upon 0. Here again 0 has a certain range 0 of possible values and, at least in some cases, the distribution of X given 0 may be assumed known.
Example 4. Screening chemical compounds for curative properties against cancer. In his contribution to the Fourth Berkeley Symposium Nathan Mantel described an impressive research program now going on in several centers intended to determine those chemical compounds that offer a promise of cure of cancer. The intention is to try each of a large number of compounds, and it is this large number of treatment that creates a particular difficulty: because of the space limitation, the number of replicates used must be limited. The procedure with each treatment may be visualized as follows.
A small number n of animals are exposed to some carcinogen and then are given a treatment T. Some experimental random variable X is then observed for each animal, perhaps the survival time or the number and sizes of tumors in a given organ observable after so many weeks. Here 0 stands for the effect of treatment T, a parameter intervening in the distribution of X. The statistical problem consists in devising a method of using the observable X's in order to select for closer study those of the tested chemicals that offer promise as remedies against cancer.
The "very classical" solution of these and of thousands of similar problems is provided by the famous Bayes' formula. In addition to the data mentioned at the outset of this section, namely the parameter space 0, the experimental space E and the conditional probability distribution P0 of X, defined over E for every 0 E 0, Bayes' formula requires an extra datum. This extra datum is the so called a priori probability distribution of 0 in 0. With deference to Bayes this distribution will be denoted by B. If B is given then, for any observed X = x, Bayes' formula gives the a posteriori distribution of 0, or, in simpler language, the conditional distribution of 0 given X = x, say
When X = x is observed, then formula ners in order to answer the questions p puting their posterior probabilities. On bable or its expected value, etc.
The trouble is that, in many cases m problem considered imply the rando imply the distribution of X given 0, th formula (1) cannot be used. This is no example may clarify the ideas. In order to estimate the genetical composition 0 of I, an ex I, is allowed to selffertilize and produces n progeny. Among of identifiable recessives is X and the same Mendelian Theor of X given 0. Specifically, (3) P{X=011} -= P{X=O I, : AA} =1, (4) P { X k 02} P { X= k I I:Aa } = ( k n-k, k=0,1,2,...,n.
Here, then, the conditions of the problem, namely the simple Mendelian Law, that imply the distribution of X given 0 as in formulas (3) and (4), imply also the probability distribution of 0 on its space = (01, 02). As a result, Bayes' formula (1) can be applied without any extraneous assumption. This is not so in the four earlier examples selected so as to illustrate the range of possibilities. Contrary to what prevails in Example 5, the earlier examples involve no single chance mechanism implying both the distribution of the observable X and of the unobservable 0. In the astronomical example 2 and in the example 3 concerned with diagnostic tests, an extra structure is easily visualized implying that 0 is a random variable. In one case one might think of a chance mechanism being the origin of multiple systems of galaxies. In the other case, one may visualize a steady clientele of a clinic, recruited from a particular social stratum subject to a fixed system of various "risks". In both these cases I expect little reluctance in considering that the relevant 0 is a random variable. However, in order to apply the Bayes' formula, the randomness of 0 is not sufficient. One must also know the a priori distribution of 0 and the datum In reviewing the five examples quoted, it will be seen that it i illustrative of the usual practice. The fifth example is rather s artificial. It is true that in atomic and nuclear physics one can situations, but these are rare.
The above circumstances were noticed long ago, and ther the Bayes' front in mathematical statistics. It is characteriz frequently strong feeling that it is possible to devise a mathem the observable X so as to provide justifiable selection of act decisions) regarding 0 even in those cases where the datum include the a priori distribution of 0. Innumerable minds, gre best to produce a solution. The remedies offered were many, a incomplete and is meant only for illustration.
Before proceeding to this list, a remark regarding the termi paper is in order. Some of the colleagues who read the first dr gested that the term "Bayes' front" may be misleading and th "problem of statistical inference." My reason for preferring " word "inference" appears associated with a particular me "Bayes' front," contrasted with another method symbolized by havior" and "statistical decision making," a distinction that terminology adopted will make it convenient to speak of the " the Bayesian problem" contrasted with the "behavioristic" proach" to the same problem.
ATTACKS ON THE BAYES' FRONT
I wish to begin with a particular attach on the Bayes' front for which have great respect. This attack was made, independently and practica ously, by two great scholars, Serge Bernstein in Russia and Richard Germany. I do not know when Bernstein published his result, but I Bernstein's lectures in 1915 or 1916. The result of von Mises was publishe Both results give a theorem to the general effect that, if the a priori prob of 0 is continuous then, as the number of independent observations is in a posteriori distribution of 0 given by (1) tends to a calculable limit, inde the a priori distribution. Thus, if in a given case there is no reluctance t as a random variable with a smooth probability density, and if one perfo number of observations, it is more or less immaterial what function one instead of B. Through this theorem Bernstein and von Mises provid information on the behavior of Bayes' formula with reference to a conditions.
From the applied statistical point of view, it is obvious that the Bernstein-von Mises approach solves some of the difficulty on the Bayes' front, but is far from removing it. First of all, in an overwhelming number of cases the circumstances limit the number of observations severely. In the astronomical example 2, there is possible just one observation on X characterizing a given galaxy (assuming that this observation is errorless). In medical practice it is rare that the technicians take more than one single sample of blood, etc. But then what about those frequent cases where one is reluctant to consider 0 as a random variable?
The next category of attacks on the Bayes' front I am going to mention is "the easy way out". This category is composed of innumerable attempts to postulate away the difficulty. The postulates proposed are of two different kinds. One is exemplified by the so called principle of insufficient reason. This is to the general effect that, if one is ignorant of the a priori distribution of 0, one "has the right" to assume that it is uniform over 0. A modification of this principle adopted by certain authors consists in substituting in (1) instead of B an arbitrarily selected function other than that implying uniformity over 0. In certain cases, similar procedures are surrounded by an impressive array of axioms, terminology and deductions. However, in all cases of the kind discussed, one is led to Bayes' formula with a function B not implied by the nature of the problem considered.
The characteristic feature of the works of the kind described is that, contrary to what we have seen with regard to the Bernstein-von Mises theorem, they do not provide new information. Instead, the writings of particular writers, so to speak, "authorize" us to use certain substitutes for the prior distribution when this is either unavailable or nonexistent. Some other writers go farther than that and more or less prescribe the use of substitute a priori distributions. As I see it, whether the form of the dictum is just permissive or normative, it is dogmatic and solves no problem.
Another kind of the "easy way out" treatment of the problem advanced before World War II, and still being advanced now, begins by giving up the use of Bayes' formula whenever the problem at hand does not imply the a priori distribution of 0, which I consider to be a step in the right direction. However, the next step made appears to me questionable. It consists in the invention of certain functions, say L (x, 0), and in adopting them as "new measures of confidence or diffidence" in the given value of 0 when the observations give X = x. Here again some of the authors concerned do not stop at using the invented functions themselves, but emphatically prescribe the use of these functions by others. When someone asks the question "Why?" the reply is usually lengthy, may involve references to "Rational mind" and various axioms, but studiously avoids giving information as to any verifiable consequences of adopting the given receipe or of declining to do so. Here again, I see distinct marks of dogmatism.
Traditionally, the two approaches to the Bayesian problem just described are connected with the term "inference". This connection can be traced to the pre-von Mises interpretation of probability as a measure of confidence rather than as a conceptual counterpart of relative frequency. The sensations of confidence and uncertainty being subjective and complex, it is not unnatural for different individuals to formalize the measure of confidence or uncertainty in a variety of ways and to come up withr different sets of axioms or postulates as described above.
In the present paper the term "inferential theory" and its derivatives will be used to describe the attempts to solve the Bayes' problem with a reference to confidence, beliefs, etc., through some supplementation of the usual basic datum of the problem the parameter space ., the sample or the experimental space E, and the distribution of the observable X defined over E for every 0 s 0, with the possible further specification that 0 itself is a random variable. The supplementations I have in mind are either a substitute a priori distribution of 0 or a new measure of uncertainty. As already mentioned, in my opinion, the inferential theory solves no problem but, given a degree of earnestness of the authors, may create the illusion that it does. (b) In the set of conditions described, specifying 0, E, P6, and A, but nothing else, errors in judgments (or actions, or decisions) regarding 8 are unavoidable.
(c) Any judgment (or action, or decision) taken as a result of observing X = x, is a function of X, which is a random variable. Therefore, this action itself, say a(X), has the character of randomness, with a distribution computable from the PO specifically included in the conditions of the problem.
(d) With reference to (b) it appears interesting to inquire about the relative frequency, or probability, with which a given function a(X) will lead to erroneous conclusions regarding D. And this leads to the final question:
(e) Given ?, E, Po and A, how to define a function a(X) from E to A so that it will be a random variable for all 0 s 0 and so that its use would guarantee small probabilities of errors in judgments (or decisions or actions) regarding 8,?
Of the five points listed it is point (c) that is the decisive one. It is the realization that a(X) is a random variable that broke the stagnation of the preceding period and the routine of thought established by the continuous preoccupation with the Bayes' formula. The random variables commonly considered at the time were numerical random variables or their sets and an explicit consideration of a random variable with "values" described as "assertions" or "decisions" or "actions" was a novelty that many contemporary statisticians found difficult to assimilate.
As is well known, the period marked by the above considerations culminated in the memorable works by Abraham Wald [5] , [6] . The characteristic feature of studies in the particular direction described is a complete absence of any reference to "confidence". The principal subject of study became the functions a(X), the so-called statistical decision functions, and their properties ("performance characteristics") with reference to the variously understood and variously evaluated "errors", or "losses" incurred due to "errors".
With reference to the possibility that the parameter 0 may be a random variable with an unknown distribution B, statistical decision functions were sought (e.g. confidence intervals) with properties independent, or approximately independent, of B. However, the main preoccupation of the period was the case where 0 is not a random variable. This particular point will be referred to later.
The findings of the theory motivated by considerations (a) to (e) may be symbolized by the following: in the given conditions ?, E, Po, A, the probabilities of errors (or the upper bounds of such probabilities, etc.) cannot be less than a stated limit and this limit can be achieved by using the specified decision function, say a*(X).
Because of the explicit references to the consequences of adopting this or that statistical decision function, that is of following this or that rule of adjusting decisions to the observations the theory described may be called "behavioristic" or "theory of decision making". It is hoped that this terminology will emphasize the contrast with the "inferential" approach defined earlier.
Currently, many of the concepts of the behavioristic theory of statistics are in frequent use in many domains. However, their acceptance was not immediate. The reverberations of the now old disputes have been recently reviewed by Pitman [7] . The breakthrough of the 1930's just described created a ne number of "fronts" of its own. Since World War II we have witnessed several important "breakthroughs" on these new fronts. The first seems to be due to Charles Stein [8] whose two-sample procedure insures a predictable power function in cases where this was thought to be impossible. Next came the breakthroughs of Tukey [9] and Scheffe [10] on the front of the multiple comparison problem. There were others. Several priority surprises occurred. The possibility of the behavioristic treatment of the point estimation problem was traced to Laplace and Gauss [11] . Confidence intervals for the binomial p were found to have been discovered by E. B. Wilson [12] , who used a conceptual structure of his own. A faultless statement of the problem of confidence regions, and its solution, has been found in a short paragraph of an early paper by Hotelling [13] . However, on the Bayes' front proper it was not "all quiet". For example, at the Washington meeting of the International Statistical Institute of 1947 and, two years later, at the Paris International Congress of Philosophy of Science, the Italian statisticians headed by Corrado Gini complained that the "AngloSaxon School of Statistics" neglects probabilities a priori. They were joined by others who protested that, in many cases similar to my Example 3, previous experience creates in the experimenter a strong feeling that some of the values of the parameter 0 are distinctly more probable than others and that this experience is entirely ignored by tests of hypotheses and by confidence intervals. The complaints of the above kind were frequently quite loud, but for a long time no specific solution was offered. We lived through phase (i) of a new developmental cycle on the Bayes' front.
The breakthrough relating directly to the utilization of previous experience occurred in the paper by Herbert Robbins published in 1955 [14] . With reference to situations exemplified by my Examples 2 and 3 (diagnostic tests in a clinic, multiple galaxies), Robbins considered as given that the parameter 0 is a random variable but with an unknown distribution B. In addition, Robbins assumed that the statistician has to deal with a sequence of cases characterized by independent and identically distributed pairs of random variables (0i, Xi), i = 1, 2, .... Each 60 was assumed to have the same (unknown) marginal distribution B and, given 0i, the corresponding variable Xi was assumed to have the known conditional probability density Pxi(x I 0k). The next assumption was that the values of 01, 02 ..., On are all unobservable and that the observations are limited to the values of X1, X2, . . ., X,. The problem was to use all these observations, combined with the postulated existance of B, in order to estimate 0,. Robbins' term to describe this problem is the Empirical Bayes Problem. It will be seen that the conditions contemplated correspond exactly to the situation in a clinic described in my example 3.
In order to see this consider a physician P working simultaneously at two different clinics A and B, meant for different clientele. Suppose that the two clinics use the services of the same testing laboratory. Consider a case where on the same day the physician P has two patients, one at A and the other at B, with identical outcomes of a certain diagnostic test for which a decision theoretical estimate of 0 was calculated. It is easy to visualize two different situations developing depending upon whether the physician is new to the two clinics or has a few years' experience in both. In the first case the estimate of 0 handed to the physician is likely to affect his diagnosis in about the same manner in clinic A and in clinic B. However, if the previous experience of the physician indicated that among the clientele of A a certain disease for which the estimated 0 is an important indicator is much more frequent than among the clientele of B, then there is little doubt that the role of the same estimate of 0 in the physician's thinking in clinic A will be different from that in B. In other words, it may be expected that the previous experience of the doctor will combine somehow with the outcome of the test to form a diagnosis of the patient's state of health. Here, then, we have a situation where, in a non-systematic way and perhaps subconsciously, a decision theoretical estimate of 0 is, so to speak, subjected to a distinctly Bayesian correction. This correction is performed using a rough estimate of the distribution a priori that the physician forms using his earlier experience. The question arises whether this same operation can be performed consciously and in a systematic manner. This is exactly the question that was asked, and answered, by Robbins. I should mention that an almost identical question was earlier asked by Richard von Mises [15] . However, von
Mises' answer, in the form of certain inequalities, appears much less satisfactory than which is the conditional expectation of 0 given X = x. Robbins' fo Empirical Bayes' Problem is: Find a function of X1, XA, ..., Xnsay 0n (XA1, X2, .. , Xn-1, x) = On (x) which is a consistent estimate than one such function is available, determine the one which is in Naturally, the solution of the problem must depend on the conditio of X given 0. Robbins' paper is chiefly concerned with the case wher variable is discrete. In this case the estimation of the denominato This denominator is simply the marginal probability P { X = x N (n, x) denote the number of those variables X1, X2,... , Xn,1 that ass value x. Then the quotient N(n, x) / (n-1) is an easy consistent estima Consistent estimation of the numerator in (5) depends directly o px (x 1 0). When X is a Poisson variable with expectation 0, we hav (6) f Opx(x 10) dB (0) =--XI f S x + le -dB () = (x + 1) P{X=x + 1 ).
Thus, (6) can be consistently estimated by (x + 1) N (n, x + 1) / (n -1). Combining the two estimates, we obtain the following Empirical Bayes Estimate of On N (n, x + 1) (7) fn, (x) = (x + 1)
The familiar results assert that, as n is increased, 0, (x) converges to 0 (x) with probability one. Thus, with a considerable number of earlier observations X1, X,, . .., X,,n1, the estimate (7) will be almost as accurate as the estimate 0 (x) calculable only with complete knowledge of the a priori distribution B. The gain in precision, In each case studied Robbins produces one Empirical Bayes' Estimate. This proves their existence. However, Robbins emphasizes that the problem of selecting the estimate that is, in some sense, best is still outstanding. Here, then, is a fruitful new field for theoretical studies.
There are also theoretical problems of a different kind immediately concerned with particular fields of application. For example, in Example 2 concerned with multiple galaxies, there is the question as to what characteristic X of the configuration of galaxies surrounding the given galaxy G should be considered, what is the distribution of X given the multiplicity 0 of the system to which G belongs and finally, how to obtain an Empirical Bayes' Estimate of 0. It is likely that the solution of this triple problem will be rather difficult to attain. While this probably will be the case in a number of other applied problems, the initial solutions given by Robbins for the Poisson, the geometric and the binomial distributions, with the hypergeometric being easily added to the list, can be applied directly in many domains and, being very simple, should be included in elementary courses of instruction. Depending upon the nature of the uncontrollable unknown a priori distribution of 0, the gain in precision of the estimate, in the sense of mean square error, may be very large indeed.
Before proceeding any further, let us record the exact nature of Robbins' first breakthrough. As is usual in such cases, it consisted in breaking a routine of thought.
In the earlier period, the behavioristic statisticians were preoccupied with solving category of situations where the datum includes details ("previous experience") sufficient for an approximate solution of a behavioristic problem that admits an exact solution only if the a priori distribution of the parameter 0 is completely specified.
THE SECOND ROBBINS' BREAKTHROUGH ON THE BAYES' FRONT
In the preceding pages I emphasized that the first breakthrough Robbins' paper of 1955 is applicable to cases, exemplified by my Ex where the research worker finds it appropriate to consider that the un meter 0 is itself a random variable with a fixed but unknown a pri Examples 1 and 4 were introduced in order to illustrate cases where at viduals, myself included, are reluctant to postulate the randomness of number of defective pairs of shoes per lot manufactured in San Francis have nothing to do with such number in a lot manufactured in N postulate that both are independent sample values from the same distri to be violently "stretching" the point. Similar considerations apply to t screening chemical compounds for curative effects on cancer.
In each of these two examples we have a number, say N, of disconnec either the problems of testing hypotheses or of estimation. For examp sampling of lots of shoes, there may be N = 1000 lots each with its own defectives and what we face is the problem of deciding whether the ith should not be accepted as conforming with the agreed specification ?.., N. Similarly, in the problem of screening chemical compounds, of them undergoing a preliminary test, each with its own 0 characteriz effect on cancer, and for each, say the ith of them, the problem is to further studies of the ith compound should be continued or abandon
The only thing that links the N decision problems in each of these ex they are N identical problems of testing hypotheses. Another essent situation is that these N identical problems may be treated simul example, the sampling of lots of shoes may be going on in various citie or so, but it may be agreed that the decisions about particular lots will time later, simultaneously. The same possibility occurs with the problem chemical compounds where the decision of abandoning some compo tinuing the study of some others may be taken at the conclusion of a p A similar possibility occurs also in the problem of identifying phy galaxies, although in this instance it appears natural to contemplate a ch nism determining the multiplicity of systems. On the other hand, no p simultaneous decision regarding patients of a clinic appears possibl arrive when they feel in need of medical help, and each hopes to ob service based on all the information available at the particular moment. patient must be treated using the experience provided by the earli The above represents my own point of view on the particular pro plated. Where to draw the line between cases where 0 is to be treat variable and those where such an assumption would be extraneous To all appearances, we are in the circumstances of now-classical decision problems, and the best that one can do appears to be: Treat each of the N separate problems as best we can, perhaps using most powerful tests, if such are available. This appears to have been the situation before the publication of Robbins' paper of 1950 in which he made a breakthrough that I am describing as his "second".
Historically, of course, this "second" breakthrough, of 1950, occurred earlier than the one of 1955, I describe as the first. My reason for this interchange in ordering is that the breakthrough of 1955 is easier to follow intuitively than that of 1950 and that, besides, some of the solutions attained for particular problems are, more or less, ready for practical applications. As of now, the situation with the breakthrough of 1950, which I call the second, appears to be less ripe.
The essence of Robbins' second breakthrough (of 1950) is the information that, if a statistician deals simultaneously with a large number N of identical problems of testing hypotheses and wants to diminish the overall expected frequency of errors of both kinds, then, at least in certain circumstances, he can bring this frequency below the level attainable through N independent applications of the most powerful test.
The resulting gain may be very impressive. Thus far, the possibility of such solutions has been proven for the case of testing a simple hypothesis against a simple alternative, and this limits severely the field of applications. For example, it is not to be expected that among the N lots of shoes the number of defective pairs can have only two known values, say either 5 or 50. Similarly, the curative effect of a drug may be characterized by a number of values of 0.
In addition, in a number of problems there are likely to be nuisance parameters.
However, these difficulties do not detract from the importance of Robbins' discovery; they add to the interest in the new field of study which, before Robbins' paper, no one dreamed of.
Here is a sketch of the example treated by Robbins in his original paper. The observable variable X is assumed to be known to have a normal distribution with known variance, say a2 = 1, and with an unknown mean 0. However, it is assumed that 0 can have one of only two values, either 0 = -1 I or 0 = + 1. We have N unrelated problems to be considered simultaneously, and for the ith problem there is the unknown 0 --either -1 or + 1 and the corresponding Xi = N (i, 1). The statistician considers that the two errors possible regarding the ith 0 are of equal importance and seeks ways and means to make the frequencies of these errors equal and to reduce their common value to as low a level as practicable.
When the two kinds of error are of the same importance, the most powerful test If-i < X < +1 and Xi > log _,assert Qi =+1.
1+X
If + 1 X, assert 0-= + 1 for all i = 1, 2, ..., N
The "revolting" aspect of this rule is that, for example, t of shoes delivered by a given manufacturer would depend n defectives in the sample drawn from this lot, but also, to a number of defects found in samples from lots delivered by The frequency of errors in following Robbins' rule is repr plicated formula depending upon N and also upon the pro where 0 = + 1. The asymptotic values of the expected freque approached when N = 100, is as in Table 1 . is the more effective the farther is the frequency frequency of errors may be reduced by a factor The decision problem representing simultaneo related decision problems, as just described, h pound statistical decision problem. Over the deca bins' initial paper of 1950, there appeared a few an allied subject. Robbins' first paper is specif statistical hypotheses against a simple alternat quent papers [16] , [17] , [18] Birnbaum's paper [1] is "On the foundations of statistical inference" and is concerned with "two main general problems of informative inference: the problem of finding an appropriate mathematical characterization of statistical evidence as such; and the problem of evidential interpretation, that is, of determining concepts and terms appropriate to describe and interpret the essential properties of statistical evidence."
The terminology used in treating the two problems is rich and includes "statistical inference", "informative inference", "experimental evidence", "statistical evidence" and "evidential meaning". The symbol to denote the latter term is Ev (E, x). In addition, there are terms "intrinsic significance level", "intrinsic confidence set" and "intrinsic confidence coefficient". The method of treating the two problems consists in introducing three principles, of which the first two imply the third. The first principle is "The principle of sufficiency (S): If E is specified experiment, with outcomes x; if t = t (x) is any sufficient statistic; and if E' is the experiment, derived from E, in which any outcome x of E is represented only by the corresponding value t = t (x) of the sufficient statistic; then for each x, Ev (E, x) = Ev (E', t) where t = t (x) ... (S) may be described informally as asserting the 'irrelevance of observations independent of a sufficient statistic'."
The principle S, and also other principles of Birnbaum, have a normative character. Birnbaum considers them "compellingly appropriate" and the 38 page article is concerned with the relationships, discussed on examples, between the principles and the various current statistical techniques.
The principles of Birnbaum appear as a kind of substitutes for known theorems. An example that occurs to me is that of Joseph Berkson's finding [21] that, if one drops the requirement of unbiasedness and insists only on the smallness of the mean square error, estimators may be found that are better than those computable from the existing sufficient statistic. This is an important information opening a new field of study. Yet, if Birnbaum's principle S were adopted, this field of research would have been dogmatically closed.
There is another aspect of the situation that may be useful to mention. Birnbaum's principles may be regarded as an attempt to summarize the different ways in which the statisticians approach their problems. In particular, the principle S may be thought of as providing a shortcut in various problems in which a sufficient statistic exists.
The example of Berkson's estimators shows that the current research in statistics extends beyond the area encompased by Birnbaum's principles.
Cornfield's paper [2] also advances a principle, the principle of initial impartiality. However, the general character of this principle and its use are very different from those of Birnbaum. Cornfield begins by emphasizing that he is concerned with inferences in those cases where, for one reason or another, the unknown parameter is treated as a constant, not as a random variable. The system of inferences developed is described as an "objective" Bayesian calculus. It consists in computing Bayes' formula (1) with an especially devised, or deduced, "initial function" as a substitute of the a priori distribution. It is this "initial function" that is provided by the principle of initial impartiality. Apart from terminology (for example "initial function" rather than "prior probability", etc.) Cornfield's new "measure of uncertainty" is reminiscent of Jeffreys' posterior probability. The practical effects of computing either are certainly the same. If for a given hypothesis or proposition the computed quantity is small, then the truth of the hypothesis or proposition is subject to doubt. Cornfield notes cases where his measure of uncertainty coincides with Jeffreys' posterior probability. However, there are cases of disagreement and the question may arise which of the two sets of principles should be given credence. Even more interesting is the question about a general framework of concepts within which the problem of difference between the two methodologies can be resolved. My own attitude would be to inquire which of the two methods will lead to fewer errors, but considerations of this kind seem to have been excluded. In fact, if considerations of errors and their frequencies were admissible, then there would have been no need for the principle of initial impartiality or for any other principle. Cornfield could simply use methods developed in the nineteanthirties that guarantee a low level of frequency of errors, occasionally the lowest possible level. As things are, the possibility of resolving the contradictions between
Cornfield and Jeffreys, and also similar contradictions between other proponents of the use of Bayes' formula calculated with a substitute of B not implied by the conditions of the problem appears to depend upon the relative persuasiveness of the authors concerned.
As I see it, the papers by Birnbaum and by Cornfield belong to phase (i) of a developmental cycle, not necessarily the same as the cycle marked by the paper of Robbins and Samuel. 
